The Rudolf Steiner Archive

The latest issue of the Viennese weekly Die Zeit contains a report that deserves to be read by as many people as possible. The poet Wilhelm Schäfer published a novella entitled “The Murderer” in this weekly several months ago. He describes the events leading up to a murder and the subsequent fate of the murderer. What does the public prosecutor do? The poet himself writes about it: “I based my story on an actual murder that took place in my home country a few decades ago and that caused great excitement among us children. The murdered man was found exactly as I described it: naked and without a head. In this story, the public prosecutor has found a series of events that, strangely enough, correspond exactly to what the investigation has only recently brought to light, and what no one except the investigator could have known, but which I invented in order to draw the refined reflection of my murderer. In this way, I have fallen under suspicion of complicity as a brash fabulator. And so much so that the day before yesterday I was interrogated in the matter of the “murder in the Aaperwald”."

The Vienna Academy of Sciences has not only awarded Gerhart Hauptmann the Grillparzer Prize for his “Fuhrmann Henschel” as befits its status. It has also done him a special honor beyond that. Prof. Süß, the president of the academy, who is at the forefront of contemporary scientific thought, gave a speech on the great poet of scientific thought. It is a spiritual event of the highest order that an academy shows such understanding for one of the most progressive artists. If only that were a good sign!

Readers will recall that an article about a “German poetess”, Johanna Baltz, appeared in this weekly some time ago. It shows how amateurism sometimes becomes “famous” in Germany. Miss Baltz has now sent a correction. It must be expressly noted that the author of that article personally endorses its content. But what can't you correct! I therefore printed the “correction” sent to me by Ms. Baltz's lawyer. For technical reasons, however, in a smaller font than the article itself. Ms. Baltz and her representative are now tasteful enough to use the wording of § 11 of the Press [e] Law to further spread the fame of the “famous poetess”, which reads as follows:

The correction must be printed in the same typeface as the article to be corrected.

What is left for the poor editor but to yield to the force of a legal paragraph and to continue to work for the glory of the “poet” Johanna Baltz by making the following correction?

[The correction follows on page 621f. of the notes.]

A story by the Russian writer Marie Krestowski entitled “The Son” was recently published in the “Romanwelt” series edited by Felix Heinemann. It is well worth reading. A man has lost his wife and, after her death, lives on the memory of the happiness she once brought him and the feelings he has for the son she left him. In a captivating way, with a rare gift for depicting the soul, the story describes how certain events gradually teach the man that the woman's son is not his son, that the woman has betrayed him. The adulterer is also a childhood friend of the deceived man, whom he himself invited into his house and in whom he had complete trust. This great trustfulness, however, becomes somewhat untrue; instead, the effect of the realization on the man's mind is told in a captivating way. The mind's eye wanders far beyond the individual case while reading. How many similar untruths may prevail in life that are not revealed by the power of facts like this marital bliss! It is the nature of real poets to shape the individual case so individually that we cannot find a second one that is the same, and at the same time to express a great truth that we feel is shown countless times in reality.

Automated Translation

Dr. Benno Diederich, the author of the biography of Zola in the Leipzig Biographical People's Books, has now published two essays in the Virchow Collection, which previously contained nothing about the famous Frenchman. They formed a lecture that Diederich gave at the Hamburg Literary Society, and are being made available in this form to the widest possible audience, and will certainly find a grateful readership at a time when the name Zola is on everyone's lips. In the first part, they provide an overview of the great novelistic work of the Rougon-Macquarts, which vividly orientates Zola's readers about the context of the individual novels. In the second part, they describe a characteristic side of the poet's writing style, which, explained by a variety of examples, provides an interesting contribution to the understanding of his art. In line with the tendency of Virchow's collection, the author has avoided all abstract, literary theorizing; he does not assume any knowledge and introduces his readers to the great series of novels in a completely unbiased way; he also deals with the difficult the difficult subject of the theory of environment, he treats it in such a way that the reader, without being held up by academic undergrowth, can follow a clear path step by step and orient himself on the numerous examples. All in all, a booklet that many will read with interest.

Under this title, Gusti Reichel has published a small work of art, which, although it occupies only a modest place within modern art, touches the reader pleasantly precisely because of its modesty and naivety, and can count on quiet understanding, especially from women. The small work consists of ten drawings, each of which is accompanied by an aphorism, united in a tastefully designed folder. The image and text are the property of the artist. The sheets are photolithographed from the originals and, with all their individual characteristics, have a very friendly effect. Six sheets offer motifs from the Black Forest, the remaining motifs from the Mark. The most beautiful sheets include “View from the Georgenturm in Calw”, “Mountain Ruin Liebenzell”, “Gable, Market Fountain and Forest Motif” and “Ruin of the Hirsau Monastery”. The whole thing has something special and can be recommended to quiet women's souls.

Automated Translation

in response to the article: My “imagined” revolution, by Arno Holz

Every psychologist knows the type of person who is only capable of understanding his own laboriously constructed train of thought; and who is absolutely obtuse to everything that someone else says from his point of view. Arno Holz is a good example of this type. He also has a characteristic mental trait of these people. They start to swear when they hear something that contradicts their assertions. They cannot remain in a factual discussion because they are simply unable to understand the other person.

I only mention these misunderstandings because of the nature of Arno Holz's mind. The tone in which these remarks appear would also make it understandable if I refrained from replying to each one.

I see that in order to be understood by Mr. Holz's way of thinking, I would have had to be much more detailed. Holz has no idea of the sense in which I use the word “primal lyricism”. Well, I use it in the same sense in which Goethe used the words “primal plant” and “primal animal”. Everything I said about Holz in the essay “On the Modern Soul” proves that - though only, it seems, for differently organized thought processes than those of Mr. Holz. “Urlyrik” is for me the essence of lyric poetry, the sum of everything that is common to all types of lyric poetry, regardless of the forms in which they appear. This essence will be common to all future lyric poetry with all past. Goethe says that there must be an Urpflanze, because otherwise how would one recognize that this or that is a plant.

He also says that from the idea of this original plant, one can imagine as many plant forms as one likes, all of which have the potential to live. The very first plant form that ever appeared in reality is also a special form of this original plant, a real realization. It was the same with the earliest lyrical productions. They are related to what I have called “original lyric poetry” like an outer appearance to an inner essence. This primal lyricism was never really there, but is extracted from real forms by our knowledge, just as Goethe extracted the idea of the primal plant from real plant forms. Someone can stand on the ground of a different world view from the one I stand on. Then he can dispute the justification for establishing such a concept of “primal lyricism” as I do. But Holz thinks that when I speak of primal lyricism, I am thinking of the initial stages of lyric production. If I did that, then my remarks would be downright nonsensical. And Holz is polemicizing against nonsense that I did not say, but that only haunts his head as a distorted image of my assertions. The basis of lyricism is the content of feeling and imagination and the rhythmic forms inherent in it. This basis is what constitutes the idea of “primal lyricism” in my sense. What comes in addition is the particular form in detail. Since nothing real corresponds completely to the idea on which it is based, no real lyricism will correspond to the idea of “primal lyricism”. An external rhythm will be added to the immanent rhythm. If in the Korriborrilieder and other chronologically first lyrical productions the outer form hardly allows the idea of lyric poetry to be recognized, if there, because of the outer rhythm, downright nonsense comes to light, then that corresponds completely to another fact: also the chronologically first animal and plant forms correspond in their sensory reality only little to what one can call in the sense of Goethe the Urtier or Urpflanze. Mr. Wood, you have not understood what I mean by primal poetry. I understand that, because I have known for a long time that when it is not a matter of concrete things but of abstract things, most people cannot tell a button from a lamppost. I was talking about a lamppost; you thought it was a button.

But what I would not have expected of you, you have done. Certainly not intentionally. But perhaps because you did not see my thoughts above the ghost image that has taken root in your head from my remarks. You falsify my sentences in order to refute me. I said: “Poetry will certainly discard the forms it has used up to now and will reveal itself in new forms at a higher level of development. But it cannot become primal poetry in the course of its development.” Why? In my opinion, it cannot, because primal poetry is the essence of poetry that runs through all individual poetic forms. Look at my sentence carefully. It says that. But you quote: “But it cannot become the original lyric again in the course of development.” That is nonsense from my point of view. I cannot say “again”, which you attribute to me, because “original lyric” has never existed. I have not said it either. So you have falsified my sentence.

But you don't care about understanding me at all. Otherwise you wouldn't lump together what I have carefully separated: your lyrical production and your theoretical explanations about poetry.

But to do that, you falsify again. You claim that I said: “The critic has only to understand the ‘author’, but not to patronize him.” Where did I say that? Please read: “If a ‘poet’ stops at this original form of lyric poetry, that is his business. The critic has only to understand him, but not to patronize him.” Mr. Holz, you are also an author in your theoretical book, Revolution der Lyrik. But you are not a poet in it. I have polemicized against the “author” of a theoretical book; I have tried to understand the “poet”. Whether I have succeeded in doing so in your sense is a matter for itself.

But what are you doing with my sentences! You say that I claimed that you wanted to define the “original form” of lyric poetry. Not a word of that is true either. I said, in essence, that what you give as a definition of new lyric poetry is, in my opinion, the “original form” of lyric poetry.

Whether you reject my judgment of your poetry or not is of no interest to me. Nor do I care whether you claim that I understand the biogenetic law or not. What interests me is your admission that you do not fully understand the metaphor of “midwives of criticism”. Since you do not understand this, it is understandable to me why you do not understand my other sentences either.

But now I'm done. Not just for this time. Anyone who polemicizes like you can continue to enrich my collection of psychological curiosities. I will not engage with you further. You can claim that I am the worst idiot in Europe for all I care.

A few words

[on the article “Schluss” (Conclusion)] by Mr. Arno Holz I have only a few words to say. You do not force me to be untrue to my words: “I will not argue with you any further,” which I addressed to Mr. Holz in my reply to his attack in No. 9 of the “Magazin”. However, as editor, I must first apologize to the readers of the magazine for including Holz's comments. I believe that people of this ilk should not be given the right to complain that they are being cut off. As we all know, children always want to have the last word. What would be the point of all the arguing! Mr. Holz lacks the necessary education to engage in a serious discussion of these matters. One can be an excellent poet and yet be too uneducated to have an opinion on certain things, for example, the relationship between Haeckel's and Goethe's world view. However, since Mr. Holz is so sure of victory, I must state a few “facts” here:

Mr. Holz, who in his first article distorted the wording of my assertions in the most arbitrary manner, and who tries to conceal this distortion by comparing it with the harmless reversal of the words “work” and “rhythm” in Bücher's book, now claims that I subsequently claimed, in order to justify myself, that my remarks were meant in the Goethean sense. This is a slander that Mr. Holz is most likely committing unwittingly. I have always used the words “original form”, “primordial animal” and so on in a series of works, for example in my book “Goethe's Weltanschauung”, which was published in 1897, in the sense in which I use them in the article about Mr. Arno Holz. In the latter book, I have clearly expressed how the actual (temporal) first form relates to the ideal original form. I am therefore quite indifferent to what Holz says about these things, of which he understands nothing. However, it must be firmly established that this gentleman will use any means to defend his elementary statements, which I have not even disputed, but only returned to their true meaning, against things that do not enter his head. If I wanted to accuse someone of claiming such nonsense as Mr. Holz does, I would first feel obliged to familiarize myself with the views of the person in question, especially if he has been expressing these views in a series of writings for the past fifteen years. Mr. Holz slanders in the blue. This is the escalation in the nature of his polemic: first forgery, then slander. If all this were not based on an almost touching ignorance, one would be tempted to call it frivolous. I would be ashamed to have forfeited the right to frivolity through ignorance in such a way of fighting.

“Genius and Philistine” by Hermann Türck

I had not originally intended to respond to Hermann Türck's “reply”. I know how difficult it is to dissuade someone from their pet ideas in such cases, which they have - as is undoubtedly the case with Türck - acquired through years of diligent research. I would also avoid these few words if, to my sincere regret, Türck had not taken a very peculiar path in his polemic. At the end of my remarks on the “genius” (Magazin No. 20, p. 516), I indicated the easiest way in which I could be misunderstood and therefore apparently refuted. I do not quite understand why Hermann Türck is taking the easy way out that I myself have pointed out. No, words are not important to me; but they are to Hermann Türck. He wants to save the words that he has used to characterize the genius in his book. The genius is supposed to be characterized by selfless action, in contrast to the philistine, who acts selfishly. But I have now shown that the supposed selflessness of the genius is nothing but egoism, which is only directed at other things than the egoism of the everyday person. Hermann Türck thinks he can agree with this: if I distinguish between egoism a (in the philistine) and egoism b (in the genius). He calls only the egoism b selflessness. But I do not distinguish between egoism a and egoism b. Rather, the egoism of the genius is exactly the same as that of the everyday person. When the king of Persia offers Alexander half of his kingdom and he is not satisfied with it, while Parmenion would be, then Alexander is undoubtedly the more brilliant, but Parmenion is undoubtedly the more selfless. But that only proves that the degree of egoism or selflessness has nothing to do with genius. But Alexander has a greater intellectual power of procreation, a greater productivity of action than Parmenion. This power of procreation wants to be discharged. Therefore he chooses the greater, which gives his power of procreation more opportunity for activity. But in terms of the degree of egoism, he is no different from the Philistine, of whom, as is well known, the saying also says: if you give him an inch, he will take a yard. I knew a person who was the most selfless person imaginable. He was not absorbed in caring for his own self, but completely absorbed in altruistic work for others. However, this person, who was selfless in the most eminent sense, had nothing at all that was ingenious. He was an excellent – nanny. No, if you want to explain genius, egoism and altruism are of no concern to you; it is only the procreative power of man. This, and not selflessness, is highly developed in people of genius. I was right to use the example of Darwinism as a reinterpretation of the story of creation. For there are people who would prefer to speak like this: It pleased the Almighty to create man from ape-like mammals in the struggle for existence. If a Haeckelian now comes along and says: not the Almighty, but causal necessity created man, then Türck, if he were to speak in the same style as he fights me, could reply: What you call causal necessity is just another almighty creator. I have nothing against your distinguishing between Creator a (wise, almighty God) and Creator b (causal necessity). Now, I think that Hermann Türck should not have voluntarily fallen into the trap of the “play on words” that I set up at the end of my essay.