A Theory of Knowledge
GA 2
II. Goethe's Science Considered According to the Method of Schiller
[ 1 ] In the preceding pages we have determined the direction that is to be taken by the following inquiries. They are to constitute a development of that which became manifest in Goethe as a scientific sense; an interpretation of his way of observing the world.
[ 2 ] The objection may be raised that this is not the way in which to present a point of view scientifically. A scientific opinion must never under any circumstances rest upon authority, but must always rest upon principles. Let us at once discuss this objection. An opinion based upon Goethe's world-conception is not accepted by us as truth simply because it can be deduced from this conception, but because we believe that Goethe's view of the world can be supported by tenable basic principles and can be represented as a self-sustaining view. The fact that we take our point of departure from Goethe shall not prevent us from being just as much concerned to show grounds for the opinions maintained by us as are the exponents of any science which claims to be free from presuppositions. We represent Goethe's view of the world, but we shall confirm this according to the requirements of science.
[ 3 ] The road that must be taken by such inquiries has already been indicated by Schiller. No one perceived the greatness of Goethe's genius so clearly as did he. In his letters to Goethe he held up before the latter an image of Goethe's own nature; in his letters concerning the aesthetic education of the human race he develops the ideal of the artist as he had recognized this in Goethe; and in his essays on naïve and sentimental poetry he describes the nature of genuine art as he had come to know this in the poetical works of Goethe. This is our justification for designating our discussion as being built upon the foundation of the Goethe-Schiller world-conception. Its purpose is to consider the scientific thought of Goethe according to the method for which Schiller has already provided a model. Goethe's look is directed toward Nature and toward life; and the manner of observation followed by him shall be the subject (the content) of our discussion. Schiller's look is directed toward the mind of Goethe, and the manner of observation which he followed shall be the ideal of our own method.
[ 4 ] In this manner we believe the scientific endeavors of Goethe and Schiller are made fruitful for the present age.
[ 5 ] According to the customary scientific terminology, our work must be conceived as a theory of knowledge. The questions discussed will, indeed, be of a very different sort from those which are now almost always posed by that branch of philosophy. We have seen why this is so. Where similar inquiries appear nowadays, they almost invariably take Kant as their point of departure. It has been altogether overlooked in scientific circles that, beside the science of knowledge set up by the great thinker of Königsberg, there is at least the possibility of another trend of thought in this field, no less capable than that of Kant of dealing profoundly with the facts.
[ 6 ] Otto Liebmann at the beginning of the 'sixties gave expression to the conviction that we must return to Kant if we would attain to a view of the world free of contradictions. This is the reason why we possess to-day a Kant literature almost beyond the possibility of survey. But this road also will fail to afford any assistance to philosophical thinking, which will not again play a role in our cultural life until, instead of returning to Kant, it enters more deeply into the scientific conceptions of Goethe and Schiller.
[ 7 ] And now we shall touch upon one of the basic questions of a science of knowledge corresponding to these preliminary remarks.
2. Die Wissenschaft Goethes nach der Methode Schillers
[ 1 ] Mit dem Bisherigen haben wir die Richtung bestimmt, die die folgenden Untersuchungen nehmen werden. Sie sollen eine Entwicklung dessen sein, was sich in Goethe als wissenschaftlicher Sinn geltend machte, eine Interpretation seiner Art, die Welt zu betrachten.
[ 2 ] Dagegen kann man einwenden, das sei nicht die Art, eine Ansicht wissenschaftlich zu vertreten. Eine wissenschaftliche Ansicht dürfe unter keinerlei Umständen auf einer Autorität, sondern müsse stets auf Prinzipien beruhen. Wir wollen diesen Einwand sogleich vorwegnehmen. Uns gilt nicht deshalb eine in der Goetheschen Weltauffassung begründete Ansicht für wahr, weil sie sich aus dieser ableiten läßt, sondern weil wir glauben, die Goethesche Weltansicht auf haltbare Grundsätze stützen und sie als eine in sich beründete vertreten zu können. Daß wir unseren Ausgangspunkt von Goethe nehmen, soll uns nicht hindern, es mit der Begründung der von uns vertretenen Ansichten ebenso ernst zunehmen,wie die Vertreter einer angeblich voraussetzungslosen Wissenschaft. Wir vertreten die Goethesche Weltansicht, aber wir begründen sie den Forderungen der Wissenschaft gemäß.
[ 3 ] Für den Weg, den solche Untersuchungen einzuschlagen haben, hat Schiller die Richtung vorgezeichnet. Keiner hat wie er die Größe des Goetheschen Genius geschaut. In seinen Briefen an Goethe hat er dem letzteren ein Spiegelbild seines Wesens vorgehalten; in seinen Briefen «Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen» leitet er das Ideal des Künstlers ab, wie er es an Goethe erkannt hat; und in seinem Aufsatze «Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung» schildert er das Wesen der echten Kunst, wie er es an der Dichtung Goethes gewonnen hat. Damit ist zugleich gerechtfertigt, warum wir unsere Ausführungen als auf Grundlage der Goethe-Schillerschen Weltanschauung erbaut bezeichnen. Sie wollen das wissenschaftliche Denken Goethes nach jener Methode betrachten, für die Schiller das Vorbild geliefert hat. Goethes Blick ist auf die Natur und das Leben gerichtet; und die Betrachtungsweise, die er dabei befolgt, soll der Vorwurf (der Inhalt) für unsere Abhandlung sein; Schillers Blick ist auf Goethes Geist gerichtet; und die Betrachtungsweise, die er dabei befolgt, soll das Ideal unserer Methode sein.
[ 4 ] In dieser Weise denken wir uns Goethes und Schillers wissenschaftliche Bestrebungen für die Gegenwart fruchtbar gemacht.
[ 5 ] Nach der üblichen wissenschaftlichen Bezeichnungsweise wird unsere Arbeit als Erkenntnistheorie aufgefaßt werden müssen. Die Fragen, die sie behandelt, werden freilich vielfach anderer Natur sein als die, die heute von dieser Wissenschaft fast allgemein gestellt werden. Wir haben gesehen, warum das so ist. Wo ähnliche Untersuchungen heute auftreten, gehen sie fast durchgehends von Kant aus. _ Man hat in wissenschaftlichen Kreisen durchaus übersehen, daß neben der von dem großen Königsberger Denker begründeten Erkenntniswissenschaft noch eine andere Richtung wenigstens der Möglichkeit nach gegeben ist, die nicht minder einer sachlichen Vertiefung fähig ist als die Kantsche. Otto Liebmann hat am Anfange der sechziger Jahre den Ausspruch getan: Es muß auf Kant zurückgegangen werden, wenn wir zu einer widerspruchslosen Weltansicht kommen wollen. Das ist wohl die Veranlassung, daß wir heute eine fast unübersehbare Kant-Literatur haben.
[ 6 ] Aber auch dieser Weg wird der philosophischen Wissenschaft nicht aufhelfen. Sie wird erst wieder eine Rolle in dem Kulturleben spielen, wenn sie statt des Zurückgehens auf Kant sich in die wissenschaftliche Auffassung Goethes und Schillers vertieft.
[ 7 ] Und nun wollen wir an die Grundfragen einer diesen Vorbemerkungen entsprechenden Erkenntniswissenschaft herantreten.
2 Goethe's science according to Schiller's method
[ 1 ] With the foregoing, we have determined the direction that the following investigations will take. They are to be a development of what asserted itself in Goethe as a scientific sense, an interpretation of his way of looking at the world.
[ 2 ] One could object that this is not the way to represent a view scientifically. A scientific view should under no circumstances be based on authority, but must always be based on principles. We want to anticipate this objection immediately. We do not consider a view based on Goethe's view of the world to be true because it can be derived from this, but because we believe that we can base Goethe's view of the world on tenable principles and represent it as an intrinsically sound one. The fact that we take Goethe as our starting point should not prevent us from taking the foundation of the views we represent just as seriously as the representatives of an allegedly unconditional science. We represent Goethe's view of the world, but we justify it according to the requirements of science.
[ 3 ] Schiller set the course for such investigations. No one has seen the greatness of Goethe's genius like him. In his letters to Goethe, he held up a mirror image of the latter's nature; in his letters "On the Aesthetic Education of Man" he deduced the ideal of the artist as he recognized it in Goethe; and in his essay "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry" he describes the nature of genuine art as he gained it from Goethe's poetry. This also justifies why we describe our explanations as being based on the Goethe-Schiller world view. You want to look at Goethe's scientific thinking according to the method for which Schiller provided the model. Goethe's gaze is directed towards nature and life; and the way of looking at things that he follows in doing so is to be the reproach (the content) for our treatise; Schiller's gaze is directed towards Goethe's mind; and the way of looking at things that he follows in doing so is to be the ideal of our method.
[ 4 ] In this way, we think of Goethe's and Schiller's scientific endeavors as being made fruitful for the present day.
[ 5 ] According to the usual scientific terminology, our work will have to be understood as theory of knowledge. The questions it deals with will, of course, often be of a different nature than those that are almost universally posed by this science today. We have seen why this is so. Where similar investigations occur today, they are almost invariably based on Kant. In scientific circles it has been quite overlooked that, in addition to the epistemology founded by the great Königsberg thinker, there is another direction, at least in terms of possibility, which is no less capable of objective deepening than Kant's. At the beginning of the sixties, Otto Liebmann said: "We must go back to Kant if we want to arrive at an uncontradictory view of the world. This is probably the reason why we have an almost immense amount of Kant literature today.
[ 6 ] But even this path will not help philosophical science. It will only play a role in cultural life again when, instead of going back to Kant, it immerses itself in the scientific views of Goethe and Schiller.
[ 7 ] And now let us approach the basic questions of a science of knowledge corresponding to these preliminary remarks.